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Abstract 
This paper looks at the effects of demand uncertainty and stagnancy on firms’ decisions to 
engage in R&D activities and the amount of financial effort devoted to these. The paper 
provides a number of contributions to the innovation literature: first, it adds to the revived 
debate on demand-pull perspectives in innovation studies by examining demand-related (lack 
of) incentives to invest in innovation. Second, it complements the literature on barriers to 
innovation by focusing on demand-related obstacles rather than the more frequently explored 
financial barriers. Third, it analyses whether experiencing demand barriers is a sector-specific 
feature. Firms active in high- or low-tech manufacturing or in knowledge intensive or low-tech 
services might be more or less dependent on demand conditions when deciding to perform 
R&D. We find that uncertain demand and lack of demand are perceived as two quite distinct 
barriers. While the perception of a lack of demand has a marked negative impact not only on the 
amount of investment in R&D but also the likelihood of firms to engage in R&D activities, 
demand uncertainty seems, on the contrary, to represent an incentive to spend more in R&D, 
although only in low-tech sectors. We interpret this evidence in terms of the specific phase of 
the innovation cycle in which decisions to invest in R&D are taken. Sectoral affiliation seems to 
be playing a role only for demand uncertainty, supporting the conjecture that positive 
expectations on the presence of adequate market demand are a necessary condition to invest in 
R&D.  
 
Keywords: R&D strategy, Barriers to innovation, Demand uncertainty, Lack of demand, 
Innovative inputs, Panel data  
JEL Classification: C23 O31 O32 O33 
 
a
 Department of Economics and Barcelona Institute of Economics - University of Barcelona, 
Barcelona.  
b
 World Intellectual Property Organization, Economics and Statistics Division, Geneve 
c 
 EPFL, College of Management of Technology, Lausanne 
E-mails: jgarciaq@ub.edu; gabriele-pellegrino@hotmail.it.  
*d Corresponding author at SPRU, Science Policy Research Unit, Jubilee Building, University of 
Sussex, Brighton BN1 9SL, UK. E-mail: M.Savona@sussex.ac.uk  
and Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Lille 1, France.  
 
Acknowledgements: A previous version of this paper was presented at the Workshop on 
Economics of Innovation, Complexity and Knowledge (VPDE-BRICK, Turin, December, 2013) 
and the Southampton Management School. We are grateful for all the comments from 
participants and particularly to D. Czarnitzki, F. Rentocchini and M. Vivarelli. We also thank 
two anonymous referees for the relevant suggestions to improve a previous version of the paper. 
José Garcia-Quevedo and Gabriele Pellegrino gratefully acknowledge support from the Spanish 
Ministry of Science and Education (ECO2010-16934). José Garcia-Quevedo is also grateful for 
support from the Generalitat of Catalonia (2014SGR420). The usual caveat applies. 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction  
The closely connected influences of demand and technological opportunities on the 
strategic decisions of firms to innovate and the aggregate outcomes of these decisions are 
well established subjects of research in innovation studies, since the seminal contribution of 
Schmookler (1966). This has been followed by a fierce debate among scholars in the field 
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979) and been recently revamped. Di Stefano et al. (2012) review 
this debate by examining the evolution of scholars’ positions either in favour of a technology-
push or a demand-pull source of innovation and their relative importance in fostering 
innovation.  
Interestingly, to our knowledge no previous study has analysed the demand-pull 
perspective from the viewpoint of barriers to innovation. Analyses of the factors of 
innovation success are proportionally more numerous in the innovation literature than studies 
of failures and the effect of the lack of incentives to engage in innovation. Demand-pull 
perspectives seem therefore to have overlooked the lack of or uncertainty around demand as 
factors hampering decisions to invest in innovation.  
The flourishing literature on barriers to innovation has dealt primarily with the firms’ 
characteristics that affect their perception of barriers to innovation or, when specifically 
examining the actual hindrances of perceived barriers, it has paid a disproportionate amount 
of interest to financial barriers and limitations to the financial capacity of firms to invest in 
R&D (see Hall et al., 2015, D’Este et al., 2012, and Pellegrino and Savona, 2013, for reviews 
of this literature). This bias toward financial obstacles might well reflect the relative 
dominance of technology-push perspectives over interest in demand-related incentives to 
innovate.  
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Rather than contrasting the two perspectives empirically, here we seek to rebalance 
the overall picture by attempting to disentangle the effects of lack of demand, or perceived 
uncertainty about demand conditions, on firms’ decisions to invest in R&D and the amount of 
resources they devote to the activity. The paper makes a number of contributions to the 
innovation literature: first, it adds to the revived debate on demand-pull perspectives in 
innovation studies, by examining demand-related (i.e., lack of) incentives to invest in 
innovation. Second, it complements the growing literature on barriers to innovation in two 
ways: on the one hand, by focusing on demand-related obstacles rather than on the more 
frequently explored financial barriers; and, on the other, by analysing in detail whether 
experiencing demand-related obstacles is a sector-specific feature, that is, whether firms 
active in high- or low-tech manufacturing or in knowledge intensive or low-tech services are 
more or less dependent on demand conditions when deciding to perform R&D. 
We find that demand uncertainty and stagnancy are two quite distinct barriers, having 
substantially different effects on firms’ behaviour. We interpret this evidence in terms of the 
specific phase in the innovation cycle in which decisions to invest in R&D are formulated. 
While demand uncertainty has a weak, positive statistically significant effect on R&D plans, 
the perception of a lack of demand has a marked negative impact not only on the amount of 
investment in R&D but also the likelihood of firms engaging in R&D activities. Sectoral 
affiliation seems to be playing a role only for demand uncertainty, supporting the conjecture 
that positive expectations on the presence of adequate market demand are a necessary 
condition to invest in R&D.  
In the following section we briefly review the two sets of literature mentioned above: 
studies comparing demand-pull vs. technology-push sources of innovation and analyses of 
barriers to innovation. Section 3 describes the data employed in the empirical analysis; 
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Section 4 illustrates the econometric strategy and the variables used in the estimations, while 
Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Background literature 
2.1. Demand-pull perspectives revisited  
The innovation literature has traditionally been ambivalent on the role of demand as 
an incentive to innovation, besides that of technological opportunities. As suggested by Di 
Stefano et al., (2012), the debate between demand-pull and technology-push perspectives has 
evolved through different stages, from the rigid adoption of opposing stances by the 
supporters of demand-pull (Schmookler, 1962, 1966; Myers and Marquis, 1969; von Hippel, 
1978, 1982) and its critics (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Dosi, 1982; Kleinknecht and 
Verspagen, 1990) before settling, more recently, for a more balanced view which sees 
demand as a complementary (though not dominant) factor determining innovation. This body 
of literature includes both conceptual and empirical contributions (Cainelli et al., 2006; Piva 
and Vivarelli, 2007; Fontana and Guerzoni, 2008) as well as analyses conducted at both 
macro- and firm-levels.  
For the purposes of our discussion here, it should suffice to recall the main arguments 
in the debate, relate them to the most recent literature on barriers to innovation (Section 2.2) 
and formulate the conjectures (Section 2.3) that we then test empirically in the remaining of 
the paper.  
As Fontana and Guerzoni (2008) suggest, the intuition regarding the influence of 
demand on innovation was sparked by the seminal contributions by Schmookler (1962; 1966) 
and Myers and Marquis (1969), who claimed that the introduction of new products and 
processes is conditioned by the presence of demand or even possibly a latent demand and, in 
general, by positive expectations of profitability from returns to innovation. In the absence of 
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these conditions, firms would simply not have any incentive to innovate. Moreover, the 
adoption and diffusion of (radically) new products are intrinsically subject to uncertainty, 
which would further reduce incentives to innovate. The arguments put forward by the 
supporters of technology-push types of innovation incentives touched upon various issues, 
ranging from the reverse causality of the empirical relationships estimated by Schmookler 
(1966) and Meyers and Marquis (1969) to the difficulties of identifying the relevant demand 
affecting innovation incentives.  
It is our contention, and one we come back to later, that market size – and therefore 
expectations regarding profitability – and demand uncertainty are very likely to refer to 
different levels of demand. First, positive expectations with regard to profitability and, hence, 
incentives to innovate, despite being intrinsically linked to the fate of the new product being 
launched, are affected primarily by the macro-conditions of aggregate demand and the market 
dynamism of the specific and related products. Even incremental product or process 
innovation would be hard to implement if prospects of returns to innovation were dim.  
Second, while uncertainty might be linked to aggregate macro-conditions of demand, 
it is predominantly affected by the characteristics of the new products/services and the lack of 
information on users and their capabilities to adopt/benefit from the new product (see also 
von Tunzelmann and Wang, 2003 on user capabilities). 1 
Of course, macro- and micro-demand conditions are likely to reinforce each other, 
though in the case of incremental product or process innovation, aggregate stagnancy of 
demand might be more influential, whereas in the case of radically new products or services 
it is the uncertainty that is likely to play a major role in terms of incentives to innovate (see 
also Fontana and Guerzoni, 2008).  
                                                 
1
 Relatedly, a “competent demand-pull hypothesis” has been recently put forward, that claims that often the 
demand-pull effect is enhanced when users have advanced competences and skills and are able to increase the 
demand for sophisticated products, thereby inducing innovation efforts (Antonelli and Gehringer, 2015).  
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2.2 Demand as a barrier to innovation: stagnancy and uncertainty  
Although the literature on barriers to innovation is relatively recent, scholars have 
found substantial evidence of the presence and effects of perceived hindrances on the 
propensity and intensity of engagement in innovation activities.  
A large proportion of these studies have focused their attention on analyses of the 
effects of financial constraints on firms’ cash flow sensitivity to afford R&D investments (for 
a review, see Schiantarelli, 1996; Hall, 2002; Bond et al., 1999; Hottenrott and Peters, 2012; 
Hall et al., 2015). Indeed, empirical evidence tends to confirm that encountering financial 
constraints significantly lowers the likelihood of firms engaging in innovative activities 
(Savignac, 2008), with this pattern being more pronounced in small firms and in high-tech 
sectors (Canepa and Stoneman, 2008; Hall, 2008; Hottenrott and Peters, 2012).  
The implicit assumption behind most of the contribution focusing on financial barriers 
is that it is essentially access to finance, financial uncertainty and information asymmetries 
that reduce the financial returns of R&D investments and the ability to attract external funds, 
thus reducing incentives to invest in R&D.  
A few recent contributions have extended the analysis to non-financial obstacles to 
innovation, drawing primarily on evidence from innovation surveys, which allow the effects 
of knowledge-related obstacles (e.g., shortage of qualified employees, lack of information on 
technology and markets), market-related obstacles (e.g., lack of customer interest in 
innovative products, markets dominated by large incumbents), and barriers attributable to the 
need to fulfil national and international regulations) to be examined. Moreover, these 
innovation surveys allow researchers to look beyond the mere decision to invest in R&D and 
to take into account innovation outputs, such as the introduction of a new (to the market or to 
the firm) good or service or a new process. More recently, these analyses have been extended 
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to the effect of barriers on the economic performance of firms, through innovation (Coad et 
al., 2015) 
Even within the CIS-based literature, an overwhelming number of contributions focus 
on the financial constraints to innovation, treating the role of non-financial constraints as a 
simple control factor (Tiwari et al., 2008; Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2010; Blanchard et al., 
2013). Analyses of factors affecting the perception of all types of obstacles are provided, 
however, by Iammarino et al. (2009) and D’Este et al. (2008 and 2012). Pellegrino and 
Savona (2013) look at the effect of all types of barriers on the likelihood of being a successful 
innovator, recognizing the fundamental – possibly exacerbating – impact of other types of 
obstacles indirectly on the financial barriers and directly on the innovation intensity of firms. 
All these contributions point equally to the importance of the lack of access to finance and the 
lack of market responses to innovation.  
 
2.3 Main conjectures  
Overall, the implicit assumption behind what we consider to be a bias toward 
technology-push perspectives within the innovation literature is that firms plan their 
innovation investments in a context that is structurally and indefinitely capable of absorbing 
any innovation outputs, somewhat in line with a version of the Say’s Law2 for innovative 
products. This would apply both at the general macro-economic level – that is, a general state 
of dynamism of aggregate consumption – and at the micro-level of analysis – that is, for the 
specific product/service/sector that has been introduced onto the market.  
                                                 
2
 Put simply, Jean Baptiste Say claimed that “supply always creates its own demand” – i.e., markets are able to 
infinitely absorb any quantity of production. The Keynesian framework overall rejected Say’s Law. Here we 
stretch the argument and argue that in the case of innovative products, the uncertainty of whether the launch of 
new products or services is going to be adopted by consumers and diffused in the markets is even higher than 
that affecting standard plans of production.  
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While we do not attempt to test the technology-push and demand-pull hypotheses 
empirically, here we contest this assumption and claim that if easy access to finance and the 
availability of funds are important conditions to implement innovation investment plans, trust 
and positive expectations on the state of demand are necessary conditions for firms to enter 
the innovation contest and initiate innovation investment plans.  
Rather than focusing on market structure issues or “lack of customer interest”, we turn 
our attention to firms’ perception of the state of demand in terms of both the lack of demand 
tout court and market uncertainty. As far as the latter is concerned, we are aware that some 
scholars (see, for instance, Czarnitzki and Toole, 2011 and 2013) have analysed the effect of 
market uncertainty on R&D investment behaviour from a real option theory perspective, 
finding that uncertainty causes a fall in R&D investments, albeit mitigated by patent 
protection (Czarnitzki and Toole, 2011) and firms’ size and market concentration (Czarnitzki 
and Toole, 2013).  
Here we take a more heuristic approach to uncertainty and one that is more data 
driven, with the aim of testing whether firms’ self-reported perception of market uncertainty3 
affects their investment behaviour. Specifically, we examine whether the decision to invest in 
R&D and the amount of investment in R&D are affected by perceptions of these two 
demand-related obstacles over time and we empirically test this within a panel econometrics 
framework, as detailed in the next section.  
Further, an important added value of this paper is the analysis it undertakes of 
possible sectoral differences in the way demand affects firms’ propensity to invest in R&D.4 
                                                 
3
 As explained in Section 3, information on market uncertainty is based on responses to a specific question 
formulated in terms of whether “uncertain demand for innovative goods or services” is perceived as a barrier to 
innovation. We believe that despite the qualitative, self-report nature of the information provided by this 
question (in common with all CIS-based evidence), it allows us to draw a plausible picture of firms’ responses 
to increasing levels of (perceived) uncertainty.  
4
 In the best tradition of innovation studies, this allows us to control for the role of different technological 
opportunities at the sectoral level and, therefore, to implicitly account for the “technology-push” argument.  
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Our conjecture is that service firms are substantially more sensitive to the state of demand 
when planning their innovative strategies. This is in line with much of the literature on 
innovation in services (for a review, see Gallouj and Savona, 2009), which claims that the 
importance of customers and user-producer interactions in services is substantially higher 
than in manufacturing sectors. Accordingly, we empirically test the conjectures above for 
both the whole sample of firms and for sub-samples of different macro-sectors, as explained 
in detail below.  
3. Data  
We draw on firm level data from the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel 
(PITEC), compiled jointly by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE), the Spanish 
Foundation for Science and Technology (FECYT), and the Foundation for Technical 
Innovation (COTEC). The data are collected in line with the Oslo Manual guidelines (OECD, 
1997) and, as such, they can be considered to constitute a Community Innovation Survey or 
CIS-type dataset. Thus, together with general information about the firm (main industry of 
affiliation, turnover, employment, founding year), PITEC also includes a (much larger) set of 
innovation variables that measure the firms’ engagement in innovation activity, economic and 
non-economic measures of the effects of innovation, self-reported evaluations of factors 
hampering or fostering innovation, participation in cooperative innovation activities and 
some complementary innovation activities such as organisational change and marketing.5 
An important feature that distinguishes PITEC from the majority of European CIS-
type datasets is its longitudinal nature. Since 2003 systematic data collection has ensured the 
                                                 
5
 Recent works based on the use of this dataset are López-García, et al. (2013), D’Este et al (2014) and Segarra 
and Teruel (2014). 
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consistent representativeness of the population of Spanish manufacturing and service firms 
over a number of time periods. 
In this study we use data for the period 2004-2011 and select our working database 
from the initial sample (100,016 firm-year observations). First, we discard all firms operating 
in the primary (1,628 observations), construction (3,914 observations), utilities (720 
observations) and sewage/refuse disposal (318 observations) sectors and all firms involved in 
M&A transactions (8,543 observations).6 In line with our previous work (D’Este et al., 2008 
and 2012; Pellegrino and Savona, 2013), we then select a relevant sample. To this end, we 
exclude 6,114 observations that refer to “non-innovation-oriented firms”, i.e., firms that did 
not introduce any type of innovation (goods, services or processes) and which at the same 
time did not encounter any barriers to innovation during the three-year period, and which we 
therefore infer are not interested in innovating. The resulting sample of 78,779 firm-year 
observations is further reduced by excluding all the missing values for the variables used in 
the empirical analysis (24,315 observations), as well as 354 firms that were observed for just 
one year.    
Table 1 shows the composition of the final dataset following data cleaning. As can be 
seen, half of the 9,132 firms (54,110 observations) included in the final sample are observed 
for all eight periods (2004-2011); about 23% are observed for seven periods while only a 
negligible percentage of firms (around 10%) are observed for less than five years. These 
figures allow us to confirm with confidence the suitability of this dataset for the subsequent 
dynamic analysis. 
< INSERT TABLE 1 > 
                                                 
6
 It is common practice in the innovation literature to focus on private manufacturing and services companies 
and to exclude public utilities and primary activities owing to differences in the regulatory framework in which 
they operate. In the case of M&A transactions, firms were eliminated from the sample in the years following the 
merger or acquisition. 
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4. Econometric strategy 
4.1. Specification and variables 
As discussed above, the main aim of this paper is to assess empirically whether and, if 
so, to what extent demand-related obstacles to innovation affect two important innovative 
decisions taken by firms: their propensity to engage in R&D and, conditional on this, the 
level of investment in R&D.  
As stressed by a largely consolidated stream of literature, innovation and, in particular, 
R&D activities are processes that present high degrees of cumulativeness and irreversibility 
and, as a result, are characterised by a high level of persistence (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 
1969; David, 1985; Dosi, 1988; Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001). This evidence is fully supported 
by our data. Indeed, if we examine the transition probabilities of engaging in R&D activities 
(see Table 2) it emerges that almost 86% of R&D performers in one year retained this same 
status during the subsequent year. This percentage rises to 91% in the case of non R&D 
performers that did not change their status into the next period.  
< INSERT TABLE 2> 
 
This evidence suggests that the use of an autoregressive specification for the two 
decisions taken by a firm in relation to its R&D activities is the most suitable. Accordingly, 
our empirical strategy is based on the estimation of the following two equations:   
 
∗ = ,		 + ′  +  + 																																																																																		1 
∗ = ,		 + ′  +  + 																																																																																		2 
 
12 
 
where ∗  and 	∗  denote the two latent dependent variables representing respectively firm 
i’s propensity at period t (i = 1,…N; t = 1,….T) to engage in R&D (expressed as a binary 
variable), and firm i’s decision on the level of investment in R&D activity (the natural 
logarithm of R&D expenditure). For each firm i, ,		 and ,		represent the one-period 
lag of the ∗ 	and ∗ 	dependent variables, while  is a vector of explanatory variables that 
has been chosen taking into account both the characteristics of the dataset at our disposal and 
the main insights provided by the literature on the subject.  
More specifically, we first consider a binary indicator of international competition, 
which is equal to 1 if a firm’s most significant market of destination is international and equal 
to 0 otherwise. On the grounds that international markets tend to be characterized by a higher 
level of competition, this variable should exert a positive effect on the firm’s propensity to 
innovate (e.g., Archibugi and Iammarino, 1999; Narula and Zanfei, 2003; Cassiman et al., 
2010). However, some authors (see, for example, Clerides et al., 1998) warn of the possible 
existence of a reverse causation: most innovative firms are more likely to penetrate foreign 
markets and self-select themselves so as to engage in tougher foreign competition. In order to 
deal with this endogeneity issue we consider the one-period lagged value of this variable. 
Reverse causation has also been observed in the relationship between public subsidies 
and innovation activity. Most of the literature on the subject provides empirical support for 
the positive impact of incentive schemes on a firm’s propensity to both engage in and 
undertake R&D (see, for example, Callejon and García-Quevedo, 2005; González et al., 2005 
for the Spanish case). However, other contributions cast some doubt on the reliability of such 
a relationship because of the potential endogeneity of public funding (see, for example, 
Wallsten, 2000). Accordingly, the t-1 value of an indicator of whether the firm has received 
public support for innovation is included. 
13 
 
A one-period lagged value has also been considered for two indicators of whether the 
firm makes use respectively of patents and informal methods (registration of design, 
trademarks, copyrights) to protect its innovations.7 In this case, the rationale is that the 
positive impact of the mechanisms of appropriability used by a firm take time to manifest. 
We also use a variable recording a firm’s age to control for age related effects. The 
theoretical and empirical literatures provide mixed evidence regarding the possible effect of 
age on engagement in/realization of innovation activities. Klepper (1996) provides a 
theoretical model that points to a negative relationship between a firm’s age and its 
probability of innovating. However, as Galende and De la Fuente (2003) point out, a firm’s 
age can also be seen as a proxy of the firm’s knowledge and experience accumulated over 
time and, consequently, it should be positively related to innovation. 
Moreover, in line with various studies that stress the expected innovative benefits for 
a firm that is a member of an industrial group (see Mairesse and Mohnen, 2002), such as 
easier access to finance and positive intra-group knowledge spillovers, we include a dummy 
variable identifying this characteristic. 
A further important factor that might influence a firm’s R&D decision is the business 
cycle. In order to control for this aspect, in line with some recent contributions (see Aghion et 
al., 2012; Lopez Garcia et al., 2013), we use a micro-level perspective to identify 
idiosyncratic shocks to firms by considering firm’s sales growth.  
Finally, in line with the Schumpeterian tradition, we consider a variable reporting the 
log of the total number of employees as a measure of firm size and a set of industry dummies 
variables (based on the 2-digit CNAE codes8).  
                                                 
7
 Previous studies generally show a clear-cut, positive link between these factors and a firm’s innovative activity 
(see Levin et al., 1987; Salomon and Shaver, 2005; Liu and Buck, 2007). 
8
 The Spanish industrial classification codes (CNAE) correspond to the European NACE taxonomy. 
14 
 
In the case of the demand-related obstacles, in line with the discussion in Section 2 
and the rationale underpinning this, we single out two binary variables that identify an 
increase (over a yearly base) in the degree of importance (irrelevant, low, medium, high) that 
firms assign to the two barriers, specified as “uncertain demand for innovative goods and 
services” and “lack of demand for innovation”.9 Finally, we control for possible additional 
negative effects of other obstacles to innovation, including a dichotomous variable recording 
an annual increase in the importance of the firm’s level of perception of the remaining 
obstacle categories (cost and knowledge related obstacles, market dominated by established 
firms). Table A1 in the Appendix shows the list of variables, their acronyms and a detailed 
description.  
4.2. Econometric methodology  
The dynamic nature of equation (1) and (2), together with the fact that equation (2) 
can only be observed for those firms that invest in R&D activities, leads us to employ an 
econometric methodology based on the application of a dynamic type-2 tobit model (see 
Ameniya, 1984).  
The simultaneous estimation of the dynamic equations (1) and (2) requires to 
carefully take into account three methodological issues: 1) the occurrence of sample 
selection, since eq. (2) can only be observed for those firms that invest in R&D activities; 2) 
the presence of unobserved individual effects, calling for a fixed effects or a random effects 
specification; 3) the correlation between the initial conditions and the individual effects: this 
problem occurs because the first observation referring to a dynamic variable (initial 
condition) is determined by the same data generation process. 
                                                 
9
 We opted to use these constructed variables in light of the high within-variation of the obstacle variables. 
However, by construction, the variables take the value 0 in the case of firms persistently assessing the two 
barriers as highly relevant. We therefore perform robustness checks by considering instead two dichotomous 
variables taking the value 1 when a firm evaluates as highly relevant the lack/uncertainty of demand and 0 
otherwise. The results shown in tables A3-A4 and A5 in the Appendix are remarkably consistent with those 
discussed in Section 5.2. 
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In order to deal jointly with these problems, we use the methodology proposed by 
Raymond et al. (2010).10 First, we assume the individual error terms,  and , to have a 
joint distribution and we apply a random-effects approach. Second, we treat the initial 
conditions problem in line with Wooldridge (2005), and assume that the unobserved 
individual effects depend on the initial conditions and the strictly exogenous variables: 
 
 =  +  +	 +	 																																																																																														3 
 =  +  +	 +	 																																																																																														4 
 
where  and  are constants,  and  are the initial values of the dependent variables 
and  is the Mundlak within-means (1978) of  . The vectors (	, 	) and ( , ) are 
assumed to be independently and identically (over time and across individuals) normally 
distributed with means 0 and covariance matrices, equal to: 
 
Ω	 =  1 ρ !σ!ρ !σ! σ! # 	and		Ω''	 = 
σ'  ρ' '!σ' σ'!ρ' '!σ' σ'! σ'! # 
 
 
Hence, the likelihood function of a given firm i, starting from t=1 and conditional on 
the regressors and the initial conditions, can be written as: 
 
 
( = ) )*(
+
,
- , |, ,	,  , , ,	, X, , 01, 2
3
	3
2												5
3
	3
 
 
                                                 
10
 We thank the two anonymous referees inducing us to use this robust update econometric methodology. 
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where ∏ (+, -, |, ,	, , , ,	, ,  , 0	represents the likelihood 
function once the individual effects have been integrated out and can be treated as fixed, and 
1,  is the bivariate normal density function of	, ′.  
Finally, to take into account sample selection, equations (1) and (2) are jointly 
estimated by using a conditional maximum likelihood estimator and are correlated through 
the individual effects (ρ' '! ≠ 0) and the idiosyncratic error terms (ρ ! ≠ 0). The ‘total’ 
correlation between the two equations being: 
 
ρ9:9 = ρ' '!σ' σ'! + ρ !σ!;-σ'  + 10-σ'! + σ! 0
																																																																																																6 
 
5. Empirical evidence 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
One of the conjectures put forward in this paper is that a firm’s sectoral affiliation is a 
major determinant of the presence and dimension of the effects of demand obstacles on its 
innovative behaviour. Following the classification proposed by Eurostat and based on an 
aggregation of NACE manufacturing and service sectors, we identify four macro-categories: 
high/medium-high technology manufacturing industries (HMHt), low/medium-low 
technology manufacturing industries (LMLt), knowledge-intensive services sectors (KIS) and 
less knowledge-intensive services sectors (LKIS). Table 3 reports the sectoral (2 digit) 
composition and the distribution of these four macro-categories and the mean of the two 
demand obstacle variables Lack of demand and Uncertainty for each sector. In terms of 
sectoral composition, there is a slight prevalence of LMLt firms, which represent 35% of total 
observations, while the remaining 65% of the observations are roughly equally distributed 
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among the three other sectoral categories (HMHt, KIS and LKIS). These figures are 
consistent with the Spanish sectoral structure, which, compared to the average for the 
European Union, specialises in products and services with less technological content (García 
Delgado and Myro, 2014). Nevertheless, the presence of HMHt and KIS firms is significant, 
as they represent 14% and 19% respectively of the total employment of the sample. In 
particular, within he HMHt category, the most important industries are motor vehicles, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals while for KIS is financial intermediation and insurance. If we 
consider the sectoral frequencies in terms of the macro-categories, around 22% of the LMLt 
firms operate in the food, beverage and tobacco sectors; around 29% of HMHt companies are 
active in the chemical sectors; 35% of KIS firms carry out computer programming activities 
and, finally, 36% of the LKIS firms are active in the trade sector.  
Across these four macro-sectors, almost 20% of firms have experienced an increase in 
the perceived degree of importance of demand uncertainty, while a lower percentage (around 
16%) experienced an increase in the degree of importance of the lack of demand as a 
perceived obstacle. In particular, no striking differences can be found, with a percentage 
range running from 13.54 (HMHt) to 17.90 (LKIS) for the Uncertainty variable and from 
17.39 (HMHt) to 22.26 (LKIS) for the Lack of demand variable. Overall, these figures reveal 
a high sensitivity of firms to changes in the demand condition that can hamper their 
innovation activities. This evidence is further corroborated by the figures in Table 4, which 
report the mean values (in percentages) of the two demand-related obstacles by year and 
sectoral categories. However, these variables show a considerable within variation.  
 
< INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4> 
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Our examination of possible sectoral specificities in terms of a firm’s characteristics 
(see Table 5 for the summary statistics – mean and standard deviation – of the variables 
presented above) reveals that some of the differences are in line with expectations. 
Specifically: 1) HMHt and KIS firms appear to be more likely to engage in R&D, to invest 
more in R&D and to have a higher probability of receiving subsidies for their innovation 
activity (in line with the previous discussion) than the other two categories; 2) firms in the 
manufacturing sectors show a much higher propensity to export than those active in the 
services sectors; 3) while no striking sectoral differences emerge with respect to the firm’s 
propensity to use informal methods of protection (the lowest percentage being associated, as 
expected, with LKIS firms), HMHt firms are more likely to protect the results of their 
innovation activity by means of patents than the firms operating in the other sectors (with 
only 5% of LKIS firms resorting to appropriability methods of this type) are. If we examine 
the remaining variables, on average 37% of the observations refer to firms that are part of an 
industrial group: this percentage ranges from 34% for firms in the LMLt category to 42% for 
those in the HMHt group. Finally, turning to the size (ln(Size)) and age (ln(Age)) variables, 
on average, firms acting in the KIS sectors appear to be younger and smaller than their 
counterparts in the other sectoral categories.11  
 
< INSERT TABLE 5> 
 
                                                 
11
 It is worth nothing that, since we use panel data, the revealed negative relationship between R&D and age 
might be due to a survivorship bias. Indeed, as the subsequent surveys can only account for firms that have 
survived until the date of data collection, the probability that the resulting sample may be biased towards the 
more successful companies is not negligible. This could be particularly true for new born and young firms 
which are more likely to be affected by early failure.  
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Table 6 reports the mean values of the variables for the four different firm types 
identified by taking into account their “demand obstacle status”. More specifically we 
distinguish those firms that did not experience an increase in the degree of relevance assigned 
to either of the two obstacles, from those that report an increase in the degree of importance 
of only the lack of demand obstacle; only the uncertainty demand obstacle; or both types of 
demand obstacle. We find that firms belonging to the first category present quite distinct 
characteristics from those in any of the remaining groups. Specifically, firms that did not 
report any increase in the degree of relevance assigned to either of the two obstacles show 
higher values for all the variables considered, with the exception of the variables of other 
obstacles and sales growth. In contrast, and as expected, firms reporting positive values for 
the demand obstacle variables appear to be less R&D oriented (both in terms of the 
probability of conducting the activity and the level of investment) than their counterparts, and 
this is particularly true in the case of firms that report an increase in the level of importance 
of the lack of demand obstacle. This evidence is largely robust across the four sectoral 
categories. Albeit solely at the descriptive level, this evidence seems to suggest that, 
regardless of the sector, demand conditions play an important role in affecting innovative 
firms’ decisions. We test this in an econometric framework in the next section.  
 
< INSERT TABLE 6 > 
 
5.2. Econometric results 
The econometric results of the dynamic panel data type-2 tobit model for the whole 
sample are reported in Table 7. The upper part of the table shows the estimated parameters of 
the main variables of interest, the demand obstacles, and the control variables, while the 
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bottom part reports the coefficients of the initial conditions (	, ) the crossequation 
correlations ρ' ρ'! , ρ !) and the standard deviations of the error terms (σ' ,σ'!,σ!. 
 
5.2.1 Uncertainty, lack of demand and R&D strategies  
We first focus on our main variables of interest, and discuss the results on the control 
variables in the next section.  
We find that an increase in the perception of demand uncertainty for innovative goods 
or services does not have any effect on firms’ decisions to invest or not in R&D, while having 
a positive effect on the amount of R&D invested. It should be noted that this result seems to 
be driven by the effect of demand uncertainty, conditional on the propensity to engage in 
R&D, on R&D investment in low/medium-low tech manufacturing industries (see column 2 
of Table 8).  
As discussed in Section 2, the theoretical literature examining the relationship 
between uncertainty and R&D does not offer a conclusive answer. The few empirical studies 
in the field seem to support a negative relationship (Czarnitzki and Toole, 2011 & 2013), 
while some recent research (Stein and Stone, 2013) finds a positive relationship between 
uncertainty and R&D investment, which seems to be supported by the results of our 
estimations. The evidence of firms opting to invest or devote more of their budget to R&D in 
response to increases in the perceived level of demand uncertainty is confined, in our results, 
to the sub-sample of firms in the low/medium low tech sectors only. As a consequence, we 
interpret this to be a sector-specific defensive strategy in response to an increase in the 
perceived uncertainty of demand, in markets where price-competition is particularly harsh.  
Our interpretation seems to find support in the literature: the positive relation between 
uncertainty and R&D behaviour is explained by a “caution effect” that leads to a reduction in 
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the responsiveness of R&D to changes in business conditions when uncertainty is higher 
(Bloom, 2007; Bloom et al., 2007). 
Also, our findings support the (robust) evidence on the persistence over time of R&D 
activities (see also Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001): decisions to invest in R&D belong to firms’ 
structural, long-term strategies. R&D projects are characterised by high sunk costs, long lags 
between decisions to invest and project completion and an intrinsic high level of uncertainty, 
particularly technical uncertainty (Pindyck, 1993). After all, when investing in basic research 
and in the first phases of applied research, returns to R&D are not only highly uncertain but 
in most cases highly risky. Part of the demand uncertainty might therefore be already 
“incorporated” in the strategic horizon of firms’ decisions and may even be considered an 
incentive to face uncertainty by competing in terms of product quality within markets that 
tend to compete on prices.  
In contrast, and interestingly for the purpose of our analysis, our findings show that 
firms’ perception of lack of demand has a strong and significant negative effect on R&D 
strategy. Forecasting low demand for new goods and services not only has a negative effect 
on the amount invested in R&D but also reduces the likelihood of engaging in R&D 
altogether.12 Although a general stagnation of demand may affect prices and therefore lead to 
a net increase in demand for cheaper innovative products (OECD, 2012), our results show 
that the negative effect is dominant. This might suggest that, rather than the uncertainty 
around the demand for a single product or for a specific portfolio of products, it is the general 
expectation on the macro-economic conditions that ultimately favour decisions to invest in 
R&D.  
                                                 
12
 Even when considering the joint effect of the increase in lack and uncertainty of demand, as shown in Table 
2A in the appendix, it clearly emerges that the negative effect of the perceived lack of demand dominates over 
uncertainty, as the net effect is still negative.  
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Although firms might well respond to prospects of falling profitability due to 
recessive macro-economic conditions by increasing their investments in R&D (Antonelli, 
1989)13, our results seem to support the view that R&D investments tend in general to be pro-
cyclical (Barlevy, 2007), with times of recession and demand stagnancy or decrease being 
associated with a reduction of R&D investments, which would further exacerbate the cycle. 
Falling demand (or expectations of it) might make it more difficult for firms to capture rents 
from their R&D investments and therefore delay R&D projects, which are then undertaken 
during periods of higher demand and expected rates of return (Fabrizio and Tsolmon, 2014), 
very much in line with a Schmooklerian pattern.  
The pro-cyclical nature of R&D investments is further supported by our findings: 
conditional on the propensity to engage in R&D, we find that an increasing perception of lack 
of demand has a negative effect on the amount devoted to R&D projects. During times of 
falling demand, firms seem to reorient their R&D efforts towards short-term and low risk 
innovations with the consequent reduction of R&D expenditures. These results support our 
conjecture that, especially in time of crisis, macro-policies that privilege austerity and 
therefore reduce aggregate demand not only affect firms expectations on production, but also 
on the more risky R&D investments. We will return to these considerations in the concluding 
section.  
< INSERT TABLE 7 > 
                                                 
13
 It has been shown (Antonelli, 1989) that, within a failure-inducement model of R&D expenditures, firms 
facing declining rates of profits have incentives to increase their R&D expenditures as a coping strategy. This is 
in line with the idea of innovation as being counter-cyclical to profitability losses due to falling demand put 
forward by Mensch (1975) (see also the works of Kleinknecht (1984, 1987) and Kleinknecht and Verspagen 
(1990). It would be interesting to test whether the behaviour of profits might influence the relationship between 
demand conditions and R&D decisions, although from our results we suspect that the declining profitability due 
to a macro-economic recessive context is likely to reduce internal cash flows to fund R&D investments. 
Unfortunately, the data at our disposal do not include variables on profits.  
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< INSERT TABLES 8 AND 9 > 
 
5.2.2 Control variables and robustness checks 
The results for the control variables present the expected signs and significance. First, 
both R&D decisions (whether or not to invest and how much to invest) appear to be highly 
persistent over time as the parameters for the initial value and the lagged dependent variables 
are positive and highly significant. Second, in both estimations, the traditional firm 
characteristics affecting decisions related to R&D expenditures present the expected sign. 
Larger firms that conduct business internationally are more likely to carry out R&D activities 
and to devote more resources to them. Moreover, although the literature is not unanimous on 
this point, our results suggest that there is a negative and significant relationship between age 
and R&D, so that younger firms are more likely to carry out R&D activities. Third, other 
variables that characterise the innovation behaviour of firms, including the use of intellectual 
property rights and being recipients of public subsidies, also have a positive effect on R&D 
investments. Finally, while firms with higher levels of sales growth are more likely to engage 
in R&D and to invest more in R&D, the increase in the perception of other obstacles to 
innovation exerts, in three out of four cases, an expected negative and highly significant 
effect on both decisions taken by the firm. These results are consistent with recent empirical 
analyses that underline the importance that size, international competition, subsidies and the 
growth of sales have, among other factors, on R&D decisions and effort (Griffith et al., 2006; 
Artés, 2009; Garcia-Quevedo et al., 2014). In addition, our results are in line with some 
recent works that have emphasized the role of obstacles to innovation in explaining R&D 
activity and performance (Pellegrino and Savona, 2013) and productivity performance (Coad 
et al., 2015). 
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The results of the estimations (Tables 8 and 9) are also consistent with most of the 
previous results regarding the effect and significance of the control variables across the four 
groups of sectors. The parameters for the initial conditions and the lagged dependent 
variables are positive and significant showing that the likelihood of carrying out R&D and 
R&D investment are highly persistent across different sectors. In addition, as in the 
estimation for the full sample, size and participation in foreign markets show a positive 
relationship with the decision to engage in R&D and the level of investment. Public subsidies 
also show positive and significant parameters across the four groups of sectors. On the other 
hand, age is only significant in the two services groups, showing a negative link as in the full-
sample estimation. Moreover, the negative effect of the variable controlling for other 
obstacles is particularly important in knowledge-intensive sectors and in high and medium-
high technology manufacturing sectors.  
Finally, the magnitude and level of significance of the extra parameters reported at the 
bottom of tables 7, 8 and 9 provide robust evidence that strongly support the adoption of the 
dynamic type-2 tobit model. Indeed, the two distinct equations (whether to engage in R&D 
activity or not, and the conditional decision on how much to invest in R&D) appear to be 
highly correlated via the individual effects and the cross-equation correlation. Furthermore, 
and very important, the high level of significance of the coefficients σ' =2	σ'! 	indicates the 
need to take the unobserved heterogeneity into account.  
6. Concluding remarks  
This paper has revisited demand-pull perspectives within the innovation literature 
from the point of view of barriers to innovation. We have investigated whether perceptions of 
a lack of demand and demand uncertainty affect the propensity to invest in R&D and the 
intensity of the financial effort devoted to this activity.  
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Our main conjecture is that expectations regarding profitability linked to stagnancy 
and uncertainty of demand are likely to affect strategic decisions on R&D investments that go 
beyond the intrinsic uncertainty, high risk, irreversibility that characterise R&D investments. 
Dim prospects for the macro-economic conditions and the dynamics of demand might 
represent more of a deterrent for firms to even engage in R&D investments, whereas 
uncertainty regarding the product- and service-specific demand and user needs, while still 
being a deterrent, are likely to be incorporated in the firms’ specific R&D strategy.  
We have found support to this conjecture. From our analysis it emerges that while the 
perception of an increasing lack of demand has a significant, strong and negative effect on 
both the decision to invest and the amount of investment in R&D, increasing demand 
uncertainty does not seem to have any significant effect or to have a weakly significant 
positive effect, in line with other contributions (Stein and Stone, 2013).  
This latter result turns out to be confined to the sector of low and medium/low-tech 
manufacturing industries. We have interpreted this result to be due to a specific response of 
low and medium low tech firms to higher uncertainty: a defensive strategy (or “caution 
effect”) that might lead firms that traditionally operate in markets where price-competition is 
particularly harsh, to compete on product quality.  
Overall, part of the demand uncertainty might therefore be already incorporated in the 
strategic horizon of firms’ decisions when they engage in an intrinsically risky and uncertain 
activity such as R&D. 
Importantly, our results provide substantial support to the pro-cyclical nature of R&D 
investments. Most especially in time of crisis, macro-policies that privilege austerity and 
therefore reduce aggregate demand not only affect firms expectations on production, but also 
on the more risky R&D investments. This might further exacerbate – although perhaps in the 
longer term – the effects of the crisis (Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011).  
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These findings add to the debate on demand-pull and technology-push approaches in 
innovation studies from the novel perspective of barriers to innovation.  
The literature on barriers is growing in importance, due to its obvious policy 
relevance. However, much of the scholarship produced to date, with few exceptions, has 
focused on financial barriers, overlooking other important hindrances that firms might face 
when deciding to innovate. Overlooking demand-related obstacles – we have argued and 
empirically shown – reflects the traditional dominance of technology-push perspectives and 
the way the debate between demand-pull and technology-push has been shaped over time 
(see Di Stefano et al., 2012 for a review).  
An exhaustive consideration of the policy implications of these findings goes beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, our results support the importance of demand as an 
incentive to innovate and the need to foster demand-side innovation policies in the innovation 
policy agenda (Archibugi and Filippetti, 2011). Although the role of demand is still incipient 
in innovation policies (Edler and Georghiu, 2007), recent trends show an increase in, and a 
growing emphasis on, the use of demand-side innovation measures (OECD, 2011; Edler, 
2013). For instance, public procurement for innovation is considered a powerful demand-side 
policy instrument (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012). Innovative public procurement 
may impact positively on the size of demand and degree of sophistication that, as the 
demand-pull literature suggests, are two important factors to stimulate the innovative 
behaviour of firms (Raiteri, 2015; Guerzoni and Raiteri, 2015) and raise the general 
expectations on the ability of markets to absorb sophisticated products (see also discussion on 
the “competent demand-pull” (Antonelli and Gehringer, 2012) in Section 2). These measures 
may help guarantee markets for new goods and services and complement supply-side 
innovation policy tools.   
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Table 1. Composition of the panel 
     
Time obs. N° of firms % % Cum N° of obs. 
2 384 4.26 4.26 768 
3 511 5.55 9.81 1,533 
4 647 7.08 16.89 2,588 
5 893 9.85 26.74 4,465 
6 2,123 23.25 49.99 12,738 
7 4,574 50.01 100.00 32,018 
Total 9,132 100 
 
54,110 
Note: the final sample only comprises firms for which a lag of the 
dependent variable is available. This implies that t=2 refers to 
firms that are observed for at least three periods, t=3 corresponds 
to firms that are observed for four periods and so on. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Transition probabilities: R&D performers 
    
Pe
rfo
rm
er
 
in
 
t-
1  Performer in t 
 
R&D 
 
0 1 
0 90.95 9.05 
1 14.15 85.85 
Total 43.98 56.02 
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Table 3. Sectoral composition for macro categories (relative frequencies) and percentage of 
firms that experienced an increase in the degree of importance of the demand (uncertainty 
and lack) related obstacles 
 
 
 
  
Freq. For 
category 
% over  
category  
% over  
total 
Employment 
(%) 
Incr. in lack 
of demand 
Incr. in 
uncertainty 
demand    
Low/Med-Low 18,730 100.00 34.61 18.13 16.27 19.87 
Petroleum 39 0.21 0.07 0.85 10.26 20.51 
Food products beverages, tobacco 4,109 21.94 7.59 5.10 16.50 19.96 
Textiles 1,180 6.30 2.18 0.65 13.90 16.86 
Wearing apparel 370 1.98 0.68 0.66 14.32 24.32 
Leather -products, footwear 359 1.91 0.66 0.19 19.50 18.38 
Wood-products, cork 599 3.20 1.11 0.43 20.03 24.71 
Pulp/paper-products 546 2.92 1.01 0.77 13.00 16.12 
Rubber and plastics 1,981 10.57 3.66 1.85 14.89 19.59 
Mineral products (no metallic) 1,736 9.27 3.21 1.78 17.40 20.68 
Basic metals 955 5.10 1.76 1.61 16.65 20.52 
Fabricated metal products 3,464 18.49 6.40 2.19 17.26 20.84 
Furniture 1,119 5.98 2.07 0.81 18.77 21.00 
Other manufacturing n.e.c. 1,835 9.80 3.39 0.75 14.39 18.37 
Repair of fabricated metal products 438 2.34 0.81 0.50 13.47 19.86 
High/Med-High  11,736 100.00 21.69 14.23 13.54 17.39 
Chemicals 3,364 28.67 6.22 2.26 12.90 16.59 
Pharmaceutical 909 7.75 1.68 1.52 10.34 16.50 
Electronic, optical, computer products 1,049 8.94 1.94 0.80 12.96 17.35 
Electrical equipment 1,265 10.77 2.34 1.51 13.20 18.02 
Other machinery 3,540 30.17 6.54 2.29 15.31 17.91 
Motor vehicles 1,274 10.86 2.35 4.78 13.19 18.29 
Aerospace 143 1.21 0.26 0.53 13.29 15.38 
Other transport equipment 192 1.64 0.35 0.54 15.10 17.71 
KIS  11,942 100.00 22.07 19.45 15.26 19.58 
Telecommunications 312 2.61 0.58 1.48 13.46 22.12 
Computer programming activities 4,207 35.24 7.77 3.05 15.43 20.25 
Other inform. and communication serv. 951 7.96 1.76 0.85 18.30 22.08 
Financial intermediation, insurance 1,086 9.09 2.01 9.93 15.29 17.03 
Research and development services 1,678 14.05 3.10 0.70 11.98 17.10 
Other activities* 3,505 29.34 6.48 3.35 19.60 19.80 
Education 203 1.70 0.38 0.09 15.76 20.20 
LKIS  11,702 100.00 21.63 48.19 17.90 22.26 
Trade 4,236 36.20 7.83 15.70 16.34 20.87 
Passenger transport, warehousing  1,153 9.86 2.13 8.01 20.29 23.42 
Hotels and Restaurants 708 6.04 1.31 3.43 17.37 23.73 
Real Estate 317 2.71 0.59 0.54 19.87 22.71 
Public administration and auxiliary serv. 3,186 27.22 5.89 14.52 17.92 23.07 
Other service activities** 2,102 17.97 3.88 5.98 8.52 22.65 
TOTAL 54,110   100.00 100.00 15.81 19.78 
*  Legal activities; Activities of head offices; Architectural activities; Advertising agencies; Specialised 
design activities; Veterinary activities. 
 
** Washing and (dry-) cleaning of textile and fur products; Repair of computers and peripheral equipment.  
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Table 4. Percentage of firms that report an increase in the degree of importance of the demand (uncertainty and 
lack) related obstacles. (by year and sectoral categories)  
               
  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
Un. 
Dem. 
Lack 
Dem. 
Un. 
Dem. 
Lack 
Dem. 
Un. 
Dem. 
Lack 
Dem. 
Un. 
Dem. 
Lack 
Dem. 
Un. 
Dem. 
Lack 
Dem. 
Un. 
Dem. 
Lack 
Dem. 
Un. 
Dem. 
Lack 
Dem. 
Low/Med-Low 24.07 18.80 19.92 16.80 19.14 13.91 20.50 17.25 19.15 15.33 18.58 16.73 17.98 15.44 
High/Med-High 20.00 16.91 17.69 13.32 17.00 11.98 18.07 14.23 16.90 11.54 16.79 13.88 15.25 13.38 
KIS 24.37 17.76 20.86 15.47 19.17 14.59 19.96 16.27 17.74 15.45 17.36 14.23 18.38 13.27 
LKIS 26.57 20.28 23.52 20.57 20.37 15.28 25.11 18.16 20.36 17.86 19.87 16.54 20.43 16.88 
Total 23.73 18.47 20.40 16.54 18.95 13.94 20.87 16.59 18.61 15.09 18.21 15.51 18.03 14.84 
Observations 6,616 8,524 8,439 8,229 7,931 7,459 6,912 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics: mean and standard deviation of the variables; all firms and 4 sectoral categories 
           
  
All firms  Low/Med-low High/Med-high Kis Lkis 
 Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd 
ln(R&D)  7.20 6.21 6.92 6.05 9.62 5.52 8.43 6.17 3.95 5.67 
R&D dummy 0.58 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.77 0.42 0.66 0.47 0.33 0.47 
R&D dummy t-1 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.80 0.40 0.70 0.46 0.37 0.48 
Lack of demand  0.16 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38 
Uncertainty 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42 
ln(Age) 3.06 0.65 3.19 0.62 3.20 0.63 2.77 0.66 3.02 0.61 
Exporter dummy t-1 0.63 0.48 0.77 0.42 0.85 0.36 0.43 0.50 0.37 0.48 
Industrial group 0.37 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.42 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.39 0.49 
Patent dummy t-1 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.20 0.40 0.13 0.33 0.05 0.22 
Informal protection dummy t-1 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.18 0.38 
ln(Size) 4.10 1.56 4.05 1.29 4.08 1.34 3.66 1.67 4.65 1.87 
Subsidy dummy t-1 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.22 0.42 
Sales growth 0.00 0.59 -0.01 0.42 0.00 0.51 0.02 0.78 0.00 0.66 
Other obstacles 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.50 
Observation 54,110 18,730 11,736 11,942 11,702 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics: mean of the variables by sectoral categories and by obstacles variables status (whole sample, LMLt, HMHt) 
            
  Whole sample Low/Med-low High/Med-high 
 No-
obst. 
Uncer. 
Dem. 
Lack of 
Dem. 
Both 
Obst 
No-
obst. 
Uncer. 
Dem. 
Lack 
of 
Dem. 
Both 
Obst 
No-
obst. 
Uncer. 
Dem. 
Lack 
of 
Dem. 
Both 
Obst 
 
ln(R&D)  7.65 6.87 5.34 5.57 7.36 6.70 5.11 5.37 10.01 9.35 7.43 8.15 
R&D dummy 0.62 0.56 0.44 0.46 0.61 0.55 0.43 0.46 0.79 0.74 0.61 0.67 
R&D dummy t-1 0.65 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.65 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.82 0.77 0.73 0.73 
ln(Age) 3.08 3.01 3.01 3.04 3.20 3.14 3.14 3.18 3.22 3.16 3.16 3.14 
Lack of demand  0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Uncertainty 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Exporter dummy t-1 0.65 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.78 0.74 0.73 0.70 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.78 
Industrial group 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.28 0.31 0.43 0.41 0.36 0.39 
Patent dummy t-1 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Informal protection dummy t-1 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.24 
ln(Size) 4.14 4.05 3.94 4.06 4.10 3.99 3.81 3.96 4.12 4.07 3.87 3.91 
Subsidy dummy t-1 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.42 0.42 0.37 0.37 
Sales growth 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
Other obstacles 0.40 0.60 0.74 0.54 0.41 0.61 0.74 0.54 0.39 0.64 0.73 0.51 
Observation 38,244 7,313 5,161 3,392 13,198 2,485 1,811 1,236 8,733 1,414 962 627 
% 70.68 13.52 9.54 6.27 70.46 13.27 9.67 6.60 74.41 12.05 8.20 5.34 
  
  37 
Table  6 (continued) -  Descriptive statistics: mean of the variables by sectoral categories and by obstacles variables status (Kis and LKIS)  
 
  
Kis Lkis 
 No-obst. Uncer. Dem. 
Lack of 
Dem. Both Obst No-obst. 
Uncer. 
Dem. 
Lack of 
Dem. Both Obst 
 
ln(R&D)  8.77 8.40 6.84 6.94 4.31 3.75 2.80 2.73 
R&D dummy 0.69 0.67 0.55 0.55 0.36 0.31 0.24 0.24 
R&D dummy t-1 0.72 0.70 0.65 0.62 0.39 0.32 0.35 0.33 
ln(Age) 2.80 2.70 2.70 2.78 3.04 2.99 2.99 2.97 
Lack of demand  0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Uncertainty 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Exporter dummy t-1 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Industrial group 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.38 
Patent dummy t-1 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 
Informal protection dummy t-1 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.15 
ln(Size) 3.71 3.53 3.50 3.67 4.67 4.62 4.56 4.65 
Subsidy dummy t-1 0.49 0.48 0.43 0.39 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 
Sales growth 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.02 
Other obstacles 0.40 0.64 0.74 0.59 0.40 0.50 0.75 0.52 
Observation 8,491 1,629 1,113 709 7,822 1,785 1,275 820 
% 71.1 13.64 9.32 5.94 66.84 15.25 10.9 7.01 
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Table 7. Dynamic type 2 tobit estimates (whole sample)  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 R&D Dummy Ln (R&D) R&D Dummy Ln (R&D) 
R&D Dummy  t-1 1.743***  1.762***  (0.023)  (0.023)  
R&D Dummy  t0 
0.970***  0.943***  
(0.036)  (0.036)  
Ln (R&D) t-1  0.115***  0.115*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Ln (R&D) t0  0.093***  0.092*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Uncertainty 0.003 0.041***   (0.019) (0.014)   
Lack of demand   -0.353*** -0.170*** 
  (0.021) (0.017) 
ln(Age) -0.047*** -0.132*** -0.049*** -0.133*** (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Exporter dummy  t-1 0.279*** 0.194*** 0.272*** 0.190*** (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) 
Industrial group 0.045** 0.258*** 0.045** 0.259*** (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) 
Patent dummy  t-1 0.218*** 0.250*** 0.219*** 0.251*** (0.030) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018) 
Informal protection dummy  t-1 0.131*** 0.055*** 0.126*** 0.052*** (0.022) (0.015) (0.022) (0.015) 
ln(Size) 0.156*** 0.494*** 0.154*** 0.494*** (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Subsidy dummy  t-1 0.273*** 0.330*** 0.271*** 0.330*** (0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) 
Sales growth   0.103*** 0.038*** 0.098*** 0.037*** (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) 
Other obstacles -0.119*** -0.028** -0.083*** -0.009 (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) 
Constant -2.521*** 7.369*** -2.450*** 7.416*** (0.070) (0.057) (0.069) (0.056) 
N° of observations 54,110 31,558 54,110 31,558 >u1u2 
 
0.306*** 0.309*** 
(0.015) (0.015) 
>ε1ε2 0.707*** 0.712*** (0.020) (0.020) 
σu1 
-0.637*** -0.609*** 
(0.033) (0.032) 
σu2 
-0.303*** -0.300*** 
(0.010) (0.010) 
σε2 
-0.079*** -0.078*** 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Notes; ***, ** and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. Time and industry 
dummies are included.  
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Table 8. Dynamic type 2 tobit estimates for Manufacturing sectors (Low/medium and High/medium tech  sectors) 
 
 Low/medium-low tech Sectors High/medium-high tech Sectors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln 
(R&D) 
R&D 
Dummy 
Ln 
(R&D) 
R&D Dummy  t-1 1.740***  1.720***  1.940***  1.900***  (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.053)  (0.055)  
R&D Dummy  t0 
0.774***  0.800***  0.919***  0.961***  
(0.054)  (0.056)  (0.094)  (0.096)  
Ln (R&D) t-1  0.110***  0.107***  0.113***  0.109*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Ln (R&D) t0  0.065***  0.066***  0.096***  0.097*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Uncertainty 0.003 0.065***   0.005 0.011   (0.031) (0.024)   (0.045) (0.025)   
Lack of demand   -0.378*** -0.130***   -0.377*** 
-0.171*** 
  (0.034) (0.028)   (0.048) (0.029) 
ln(Age) -0.019 -0.007 0.002 -0.045* -0.028 -0.065*** 0.002 -0.107*** (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.037) (0.022) (0.038) (0.023) 
Exporter dummy  t-1 0.340*** 0.213*** 0.343*** 0.195*** 0.252*** -0.006 0.257*** -0.017 (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.034) (0.055) (0.037) (0.056) (0.037) 
Industrial group 0.092** 0.245*** 0.110*** 0.221*** -0.052 0.320*** -0.037 0.287*** (0.036) (0.030) (0.037) (0.030) (0.052) (0.032) (0.053) (0.032) 
Patent dummy  t-1 0.215*** 0.157*** 0.221*** 0.168*** 0.094 0.141*** 0.105* 0.152*** (0.046) (0.031) (0.047) (0.031) (0.060) (0.028) (0.061) (0.028) 
Informal prot. dummy  t-1 0.139*** 0.007 0.125*** 0.015 0.269*** 0.136*** 0.255*** 0.147*** (0.034) (0.025) (0.035) (0.025) (0.051) (0.025) (0.052) (0.025) 
ln(Size) 0.219*** 0.499*** 0.212*** 0.509*** 0.263*** 0.666*** 0.251*** 0.682*** (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.024) (0.013) 
Subsidy dummy  t-1 0.185*** 0.272*** 0.183*** 0.272*** 0.205*** 0.280*** 0.205*** 0.278*** (0.030) (0.023) (0.030) (0.023) (0.043) (0.023) (0.043) (0.023) 
Sales growth   0.117*** 0.014 0.101*** 0.037 0.111*** 0.039** 0.096*** 0.051*** (0.029) (0.023) (0.030) (0.024) (0.035) (0.018) (0.037) (0.018) 
Other obstacles -0.065** -0.017 -0.027 0.007 -0.247*** -0.017 -0.216*** 0.008 (0.026) (0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.037) (0.019) (0.038) (0.019) 
Constant -2.710*** 7.292*** -2.791*** 7.501*** -2.571*** 6.998*** -2.691*** 7.219*** (0.100) (0.095) (0.114) (0.100) (0.147) (0.084) (0.164) (0.090) 
  18,730 10,774 18,730 10,774 11,736 8,985 11,736 8,985 >u1u2 
 
0.311*** 0.296*** 0.295*** 0.282*** 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.035) 
>ε1ε2 0.674*** 0.661*** 0.637*** 0.625*** (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) 
σu1 
-0.721*** -0.686*** -0.642*** -0.607*** 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.077) (0.075) 
σu2 
-0.338*** -0.347*** -0.379*** -0.386*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
σε2 
-0.070*** -0.077*** -0.190*** -0.198*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
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Table 9. Dynamic type 2 tobit estimates (Knowledge Intensive Services and Less Knowledge Intensive Services) 
 
 KIS LKIS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
R&D 
Dummy Ln (R&D) 
R&D 
Dummy Ln (R&D) 
R&D 
Dummy Ln (R&D) 
R&D 
Dummy Ln (R&D) 
R&D Dummy  t0 
1.885***  1.897***  1.539***  1.565***  
(0.051)  (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.053)  
R&D Dummy  t0 
0.791***  0.765***  1.094***  1.062***  
(0.080)  (0.078)  (0.077)  (0.076)  
Ln (R&D) t-1  0.131***  0.131***  0.104***  0.103*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Ln (R&D) t0  0.098***  0.097***  0.070***  0.068*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Uncertainty -0.007 -0.004   0.028 0.068   (0.041) (0.028)   (0.042) (0.043)   
Lack of demand   -0.260*** -0.113***   -0.384*** -0.345*** 
  (0.043) (0.032)   (0.047) (0.052) 
ln(Age) -0.129*** -0.274*** -0.131*** -0.272*** -0.116*** -0.198*** -0.123*** -0.203*** (0.036) (0.030) (0.036) (0.030) (0.039) (0.043) (0.038) (0.043) 
Exporter dummy  t-1 0.161*** 0.175*** 0.158*** 0.174*** 0.223*** 0.104** 0.217*** 0.093** (0.038) (0.029) (0.038) (0.029) (0.043) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) 
Industrial group -0.136*** 0.091*** -0.131*** 0.094*** 0.090** 0.312*** 0.090** 0.313*** (0.046) (0.035) (0.046) (0.035) (0.046) (0.048) (0.046) (0.048) 
Patent dummy  t-1 0.209*** 0.408*** 0.211*** 0.409*** 0.338*** 0.216*** 0.328*** 0.218*** (0.064) (0.038) (0.064) (0.038) (0.085) (0.067) (0.085) (0.067) 
Informal protection 
dummy  t-1 
0.042 0.016 0.040 0.014 0.105** 0.077* 0.103** 0.074* 
(0.043) (0.029) (0.043) (0.029) (0.050) (0.045) (0.050) (0.044) 
ln(Size) 0.147*** 0.540*** 0.146*** 0.538*** 0.099*** 0.295*** 0.099*** 0.296*** (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Subsidy dummy  t-1 0.375*** 0.404*** 0.371*** 0.403*** 0.363*** 0.316*** 0.361*** 0.314*** (0.039) (0.029) (0.039) (0.029) (0.047) (0.042) (0.047) (0.042) 
Sales growth   0.118*** 0.039*** 0.114*** 0.038*** 0.074*** 0.025 0.072*** 0.025 (0.022) (0.015) (0.022) (0.014) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) 
Other obstacles -0.162*** -0.045** -0.133*** -0.034 -0.078** -0.037 -0.034 -0.002 (0.034) (0.023) (0.034) (0.023) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Constant -1.720*** 8.244*** -1.673*** 8.261*** -2.217*** 8.778*** -2.131*** 8.845*** (0.125) (0.103) (0.124) (0.102) (0.153) (0.191) (0.151) (0.193) 
N° of observations 11,942 7,919 11,942 7,919 11,702 3,880 11,702 3,880 >u1u2 
 
0.330*** 0.328*** 0.238*** 0.233*** 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.038) (0.039) 
>ε1ε2 0.802*** 0.795*** 0.657*** 0.657*** (0.040) (0.039) (0.060) (0.060) 
σu1 
-0.759*** -0.793*** -0.583*** -0.609*** 
(0.088) (0.092) (0.068) (0.071) 
σu2 
-0.270*** -0.273*** -0.225*** -0.230*** 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) 
σε2 
-0.083*** -0.084*** 0.007 0.005 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) 
Notes; ***, ** and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. Time and industry 
dummies are included. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. The variables: acronyms and definitions. 
 
 
Dependent variables (Innovative Inputs) 
R&D dummy Dummy =1 if firm’s R&D (both internal and external) expenditures are 
positive 
ln(R&D)  Natural log of the total firm’s expenditures in R&D (both internal and 
external) 
 
 
Independent variables (control variables) 
ln(Age) Natural log of the firm’s age (calculated as years elapsed since founding) 
 
Exporter dummy  Dummy =1 if the firm have traded in an international market during the 
three year period; 0 otherwise 
 
Industrial group Dummy =1 if the firm is part of an industrial group, 0 otherwise 
Patent dummy Dummy=1 if the firm uses patents; 0 otherwise 
 
Informal 
protection dummy  
Dummy=1 if the firm adopts others instruments of protection than patents; 
0 otherwise 
 
ln(Size) Log of the total number of firm’s employees 
 
Subsidy dummy Dummy = 1 if the firm has received public support for innovation; 0 
otherwise 
Sales growth Growth rates of sales (calculated by taking logarithmic differences of sales 
levels) 
 
Other obstacles Dummy=1 if the firm reports an higher degree of importance (from period t 
to period t+1) for at least one of the remaining obstacles variables; 0 
otherwise 
 
Independent variables (Obstacle demand variables) 
Lack of demand  Dummy=1 if the firm reports an higher degree of importance (from period t 
to period t+1) for the obstacles variables “it was not necessary to innovate 
due to the Lack of demand for innovation”; 0 otherwise 
 
Uncertainty Dummy=1 if the firm reports an higher degree of importance (from period t 
to period t+1) for the obstacles variables “Uncertain demand for innovative 
goods or services”; 0 otherwise 
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Table A2. Robustness check: Dynamic type 2 tobit estimates with both the demand obstacles variable 
 
 Whole Sample LMLt HMHt KIS LKIS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
R&D 
Dummy Ln (R&D) 
R&D 
Dummy Ln (R&D) 
R&D 
Dummy Ln (R&D) 
R&D 
Dummy Ln (R&D) 
R&D 
Dummy Ln (R&D) 
RD Dummy     t-1 1.745***  1.743***  1.942***  1.886***  1.546***  
 (0.023)  (0.036)  (0.053)  (0.051)  (0.053)  
RD Dummy     t 0 0.963***  0.767***  0.910***  0.786***  1.080***  
 (0.036)  (0.054)  (0.094)  (0.079)  (0.077)  
ln(RD) t-1  0.115***  0.109***  0.113***  0.131***  0.103*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
ln(RD)t 0  0.093***  0.065***  0.096***  0.098***  0.068*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
ln(Age) -0.048*** -0.133*** -0.019 -0.009 -0.027 -0.064*** -0.129*** -0.274*** -0.120*** -0.198*** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.026) (0.024) (0.036) (0.022) (0.036) (0.030) (0.039) (0.043) 
Exporter dummy t-1 0.276*** 0.192*** 0.335*** 0.208*** 0.248*** -0.009 0.160*** 0.175*** 0.222*** 0.105** 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.036) (0.034) (0.055) (0.037) (0.038) (0.029) (0.043) (0.044) 
Industrial group 0.044** 0.259*** 0.092** 0.245*** -0.053 0.320*** -0.136*** 0.091*** 0.089* 0.318*** 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.036) (0.030) (0.052) (0.032) (0.046) (0.035) (0.046) (0.048) 
Patent dummy t-1 0.218*** 0.250*** 0.214*** 0.157*** 0.095 0.139*** 0.209*** 0.408*** 0.335*** 0.217*** 
 (0.030) (0.018) (0.046) (0.031) (0.060) (0.028) (0.064) (0.038) (0.085) (0.067) 
Informal protect. dummy t-1 0.129*** 0.053*** 0.136*** 0.004 0.268*** 0.136*** 0.040 0.015 0.103** 0.073 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.034) (0.025) (0.051) (0.025) (0.043) (0.029) (0.050) (0.045) 
ln(Size) 0.156*** 0.494*** 0.218*** 0.500*** 0.262*** 0.667*** 0.147*** 0.540*** 0.099*** 0.295*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.016) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
Subsidy dummy t-1 0.272*** 0.330*** 0.187*** 0.273*** 0.205*** 0.280*** 0.374*** 0.404*** 0.361*** 0.318*** 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.030) (0.023) (0.043) (0.023) (0.039) (0.029) (0.047) (0.042) 
Sales growth 0.102*** 0.038*** 0.118*** 0.014 0.110*** 0.038** 0.117*** 0.038*** 0.076*** 0.027 (0.014) (0.010) (0.029) (0.023) (0.035) (0.018) (0.022) (0.015) (0.027) (0.023) 
Dem. obst.(both incr.) -0.210*** -0.139*** -0.216*** -0.157*** -0.166** -0.122*** -0.149** -0.038 -0.293*** -0.286*** (0.031) (0.025) (0.049) (0.042) (0.072) (0.044) (0.065) (0.050) (0.070) (0.079) 
Other obstacles (incr.) -0.118*** -0.023** -0.064** -0.011 -0.248*** -0.016 -0.161*** -0.044** -0.077** -0.029 (0.016) (0.011) (0.026) (0.020) (0.037) (0.019) (0.034) (0.022) (0.036) (0.036) 
Constant -2.498*** 7.394*** -2.686*** 7.328*** -2.547*** 7.015*** -1.709*** 8.244*** -2.172*** 8.808*** 
 (0.069) (0.056) (0.099) (0.095) (0.146) (0.084) (0.125) (0.102) (0.152) (0.192) 
Observations  54,110 31,558 18,730 10,774 11,736 8,985 11,942 7,919 11,702 3,880 
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Table A2 (continued). Robustness check: Dynamic type 2 tobit estimates with both the demand obstacles variable  
 
      >u1u2 0.308*** 0.309*** 0.294*** 0.330*** 0.234*** 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.035) (0.032) (0.039) >ε1ε2 0.713*** 0.675*** 0.636*** 0.802*** 0.657*** 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.060) 
σu1 -0.616*** -0.731*** -0.649*** -0.767*** -0.590*** 
 (0.032) (0.055) (0.078) (0.089) (0.069) 
σu2 -0.301*** -0.340*** -0.380*** -0.271*** -0.228*** 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) 
σε2 -0.078*** -0.070*** -0.190*** -0.083*** 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) 
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Table A3. Robustness check: Dynamic type 2 tobit with the obstacles variables identifying those firms assessing as highly 
important the lack/uncertainty of demand (whole sample).  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 R&D Dummy Ln (R&D) R&D Dummy Ln (R&D) 
R&D Dummy  t-1 1.741***  1.744***  (0.023)  (0.023)  
R&D Dummy  t0 
0.972***  0.936***  
(0.036)  (0.036)  
Ln (R&D) t-1  0.115***  0.114*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Ln (R&D) t0 
 0.093***  0.092*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Uncertainty (high) -0.009 -0.054***   (0.020) (0.015)   
Lack of demand (high)   -0.742*** -0.393*** 
  (0.038) (0.040) 
ln(Age) -0.048*** -0.133*** -0.045*** -0.133*** (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Exporter dummy  t-1 
0.279*** 0.193*** 0.264*** 0.188*** 
(0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) 
Industrial group 
0.044** 0.258*** 0.041* 0.260*** 
(0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) 
Patent dummy  t-1 
0.218*** 0.251*** 0.214*** 0.252*** 
(0.030) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018) 
Informal protection dummy  t-1 
0.131*** 0.054*** 0.122*** 0.050*** 
(0.022) (0.015) (0.022) (0.015) 
ln(Size) 0.156*** 0.494*** 0.154*** 0.494*** (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Subsidy dummy  t-1 
0.273*** 0.331*** 0.260*** 0.329*** 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) 
Sales growth   
0.103*** 0.038*** 0.096*** 0.037*** 
(0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) 
Other obstacles 
-0.118*** -0.025** -0.118*** -0.025** 
(0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) 
Constant 
-2.519*** 7.401*** -2.431*** 7.412*** 
(0.070) (0.056) (0.069) (0.056) 
N° of observations 54,110 31,558 54,110 31,558 >u1u2 
 
0.310*** 0.307*** 
(0.015) (0.015) 
>ε1ε2 0.714*** 0.709*** (0.020) (0.020) 
σu1 
-0.607*** -0.630*** 
(0.031) (0.032) 
σu2 
-0.299*** -0.301*** 
(0.010) (0.010) 
σε2 
-0.078*** -0.079*** 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Notes; ***, ** and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. Time and industry 
dummies are included. 
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Table A4. Robustness check: Dynamic type 2 tobit  with the obstacles variables identifying those firms assessing as highly 
important the lack/uncertainty of demand (manufacturing sectors) 
   
 Low/medium-low tech Sectors High/medium-high tech Sectors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln 
(R&D) 
R&D 
Dummy 
Ln 
(R&D) 
R&D 
Dummy 
Ln 
(R&D) 
R&D Dummy  t-1 1.706***  1.740***  1.890***  1.939***  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.054)  (0.053)  
R&D Dummy  t0 
0.788***  0.775***  0.961***  0.919***  
(0.056)  (0.054)    (0.094)  
Ln (R&D) t-1  0.106***  0.109***  0.110***  0.113*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Ln (R&D) t0  0.066***  0.065***  0.097***  0.096*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Uncertainty (high)   0.005 0.015   -0.014 -0.025 
  (0.032) (0.026)   (0.045) (0.025) 
Lack of demand (high) -0.781*** -0.413***   -0.673*** -0.207***   (0.061) (0.080)   (0.092) (0.073)   
ln(Age) 0.012 -0.041* -0.019 -0.009 -0.001 -0.109*** -0.027 -0.063*** (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.038) (0.023) (0.037) (0.022) 
Exporter dummy  t-1 0.335*** 0.188*** 0.339*** 0.210*** 0.260*** -0.013 0.252*** -0.007 (0.037) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.056) (0.037) (0.055) (0.037) 
Industrial group 0.115*** 0.226*** 0.092** 0.246*** -0.042 0.283*** -0.052 0.321*** (0.037) (0.030) (0.036) (0.030) (0.053) (0.032) (0.052) (0.032) 
Patent dummy  t-1 0.214*** 0.170*** 0.216*** 0.156*** 0.096 0.153*** 0.094 0.140*** (0.047) (0.031) (0.046) (0.031) (0.061) (0.028) (0.060) (0.028) 
Informal protection 
dummy  t-1 
0.127*** 0.015 0.139*** 0.006 0.247*** 0.144*** 0.268*** 0.136*** 
(0.035) (0.025) (0.034) (0.025) (0.052) (0.025) (0.051) (0.025) 
ln(Size) 0.208*** 0.509*** 0.219*** 0.500*** 0.254*** 0.683*** 0.263*** 0.665*** (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.024) (0.013) (0.024) (0.013) 
Subsidy dummy  t-1 0.165*** 0.270*** 0.185*** 0.272*** 0.194*** 0.276*** 0.206*** 0.281*** (0.030) (0.023) (0.030) (0.023) (0.043) (0.023) (0.043) (0.023) 
Sales growth   0.095*** 0.036 0.116*** 0.014 0.100*** 0.054*** 0.111*** 0.039** (0.031) (0.024) (0.029) (0.023) (0.037) (0.018) (0.035) (0.018) 
Other obstacles -0.063** -0.004 -0.065** -0.012 -0.250*** -0.006 -0.247*** -0.017 (0.026) (0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.038) (0.019) (0.037) (0.019) 
Constant -2.780*** 7.493*** -2.713*** 7.310*** -2.690*** 7.208*** -2.566*** 7.006*** (0.114) (0.101) (0.100) (0.095) (0.163) (0.091) (0.147) (0.084) 
N° of observations 18,730 10,774 18,730 10,774 11,736 8,985 11,736 8,985 >u1u2 
 
0.298*** 0.311*** 0.284*** 0.295*** 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.035) 
>ε1ε2 0.658*** 0.674*** 0.631*** 0.638*** (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
σu1 
-0.683*** -0.720*** -0.602*** -0.641*** 
(0.054) (0.055) (0.074) (0.077) 
σu2 
-0.346*** -0.338*** -0.384*** -0.379*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
σε2 
-0.078*** -0.069*** -0.196*** -0.190*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
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Table A5. Robustness check: Dynamic type 2 tobit estimations with the obstacles variables identifying those firms assessing as 
highly important the lack/uncertainty of demand (services sectors). 
 
   
 KIS LKIS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln 
(R&D) 
R&D Dummy  t-1 1.884***  1.894***  1.527***  1.522***  (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.053)  (0.050)  
R&D Dummy  t0 
0.792***  0.753***  1.057***  1.103***  
(0.080)  (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.075)  
Ln (R&D) t-1  0.130***  0.131***  0.101***  0.103*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Ln (R&D) t0  0.098***  0.097***  0.068***  0.071*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Uncertainty (high) -0.039 -0.112***     -0.016 -0.001 (0.041) (0.028)     (0.049) (0.051) 
Lack of demand (high)   -0.614*** -0.342*** -0.866*** -0.603***   
  (0.079) (0.079) (0.082) (0.113)   
ln(Age) -0.129*** -0.270*** -0.128*** -0.185*** -0.125*** -0.208*** -0.116*** -0.142*** (0.036) (0.030) (0.035) (0.028) (0.039) (0.041) (0.038) (0.042) 
Exporter dummy  t-1 0.161*** 0.168*** 0.154*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.098** 0.226*** 0.122*** (0.038) (0.029) (0.038) (0.029) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) 
Industrial group -0.138*** 0.088** -0.133*** 0.132*** 0.074 0.302*** 0.089* 0.330*** (0.046) (0.034) (0.046) (0.035) (0.046) (0.048) (0.046) (0.049) 
Patent dummy  t-1 0.210*** 0.413*** 0.208*** 0.415*** 0.341*** 0.220*** 0.324*** 0.182*** (0.064) (0.038) (0.064) (0.038) (0.086) (0.066) (0.085) (0.065) 
Informal protection 
dummy  t-1 
0.043 0.022 0.039 -0.001 0.094* 0.075* 0.104** 0.070 
(0.043) (0.029) (0.043) (0.029) (0.050) (0.044) (0.050) (0.045) 
ln(Size) 0.146*** 0.537*** 0.145*** 0.518*** 0.100*** 0.300*** 0.098*** 0.298*** (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Subsidy dummy  t-1 0.377*** 0.410*** 0.371*** 0.410*** 0.348*** 0.304*** 0.357*** 0.299*** (0.039) (0.029) (0.039) (0.029) (0.047) (0.042) (0.047) (0.042) 
Sales growth   0.118*** 0.039*** 0.117*** 0.028* 0.065** 0.023 0.080*** 0.021 (0.022) (0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) 
Other obstacles -0.164*** -0.044** -0.162*** -0.057** -0.069* -0.028 -0.082** -0.054 (0.034) (0.022) (0.034) (0.022) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Constant -1.709*** 8.279*** -1.661*** 8.019*** -2.085*** 8.855*** -2.217*** 8.560*** (0.126) (0.101) (0.109) (0.090) (0.151) (0.185) (0.136) (0.178) 
N° of observations 11,942 7,919 11,942 7,919 11,702 3,880 11,702 3,880 >u1u2 
 
0.330*** 0.337*** 0.243*** 0.261*** 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.038) (0.036) 
>ε1ε2 0.798*** 0.788*** 0.655*** 0.656*** (0.040) (0.039) (0.061) (0.060) 
σu1 
-0.757*** -0.791*** -0.582*** -0.572*** 
(0.088) (0.089) (0.067) (0.063) 
σu2 
-0.271*** -0.262*** -0.217*** -0.203*** 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) 
σε2 
-0.084*** -0.078*** 0.005 -0.203*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.026) 
Notes; ***, ** and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. Time and industry 
dummies are included. 
 
